[Extract]
No. 148

I had the honor, Sir, to receive your letter No. 287 which you wrote to me on the 4th of the month. If the letter which I sent you on the seventh reached you before you had a meeting with Lord Rochford, it will have explained to you that we can wait with patience for a satisfactory agreement on our rights in Newfoundland² and that, while we do not intend to lose sight of this affair, we do not wish to place upon it an emphasis which might dispose the British Ministry to believe that we are trying to take advantage of their difficulties and force them into a compromise. It is not the King's intention to place the Ministry in jeopardy since it already occupies a most unstable position; were it possible, we Would make every effort in order to support it rather than strive to overthrow it. Once and for all, Sir, proceed with the negotiations, but use enough moderation so that neither Lord Rochford nor any of his colleagues may presume that we are attempting to embarass them personally. Our cause is fair, our right is established and the evidence is in our favor. We demand that our rights to make use of the Coast of Bonavista as defined in the peace-treaty of Utrecht be restored or that we be granted a suitable equivalent. It will not be long before we know if the British suffered a defeat in America; it is to the insurgents' advantage to make their advances known and they certainly were able to find a way by which to spread such news. The expedition of fine Regiments of the division of Ireland to which three Cavalry regiments might be added proves that the Ministry deems necessary to make the greatest efforts to maintain their position in that country and take command of the situation. I would think, Sir, that such would be the intention of the Ministry if the sending of these three Cavalry Regiments were verified; this kind of troops would be most awkward and quite useless, should they wish to insult our Islands and conquer them. However, the more the British increase their forces in that part of the World, the more we must guard against any harmful use they might be tempted to make of them. Anything is to be feared on the part of a Nation which behaves more often out of despair than on a matter of principle.

. . . What is essential for us is that we be informed in time of the movements in the ports. It would seem difficult to suspect the British Ministry .of scheming against their neighbours as long as they limit their armaments to ships of fifty cannons, frigates and corvettes.