[Extract]

Dear Sir As this day has given me some respite, from the Hurry of Public business, I embrace the favorable moment to give you some intelligence on our common Concern...

I am well informed, that Colonel [William] Dalrymple is on board the Phenix. As there are no Vessels here bound to England, I suspect his business here, is to examine and reconitre the State of this Colony, to enable the ministry or the General to form the opperations against it in the Spring, or to head the adherents of the ministerial party, if they should dare to hold up their heads, or to command the Regiment And the Three Companies of Light Horse lately embarked at Boston, probably destined for Queens County, for the Purpose of securing fresh provisions for the army at Boston, For as Nassau Island is so distant from the main, but where they command, they may think, and with too much reason, that the experiment may be tried without any great risque in that County. If they succeed in any degree, it will amply pay them in their disstressed state for fresh provisions; if not as they command at sea, they can easily embark in the Sound under the Protection of three or Four Frigates. It is Probable, the fears of their Creatures in that county has induced them to promise them more Success, than they can Secure to them, in order to tempt the army there for their protection. We shall do the best we can, to prepare our Friends in that county & Suffolk against such an event. But a certain necessary article is long a coming. Should not that part of New England, nearest to that county, have some intimation to be ready to give aid, if the Troops should land in Queen's?

I am very anxious to hear what is determined in your cabinet, with respect to canada, for the next Campaign. Colonel [Rudolphus] Ritzema, and Captain [William] Goforth, both write me from Montreal that 10,000 men will be necessary to secure the Colony and engage the Canadians heartily in the Cause. They also urge very much, the Sending the Troops from hence on the Ice, over the lakes to be ready in the Spring. This does not indicate any Zeal in the Canadians. If my memory serves me, General [James] Murray, gave it as his opinion, that it would require 6,000 men to man the works of Quebec, which he assigned as the reason for Hazarding the Battle of April 1760. I think this has been the received opinion. As our Enemies have the command of the Sea, and very little Provisions are salted in Canada, Suppose Quebec now in our Possession, how is it to be furnished with Salt Provisions during the next Summer, in case it should be Blockaded by Sea, and by Land? Remember that Ships of the Line, got by Quebec in the Seige of 1759; and some of the Frigates went a Considerable distance up above it.

We are in Suspence here about the destination of your Fleet. If they go to Virginia, I fear they will be ruffly handled, as some Ships of Warr have been dispatched there from Boston. The americans individuly considered, know the use of a musket better than the best of the King's Troops; to this in a great degree is to be ascribd the advantages, the former have gained over the Latter, when Secured against their discipline. But the Saylors we have picked up for our Vessels, do not understand the use of Cannon, equal to those who are continually exercised with them on board the King's Ships, nor are they so attached to the Country, from connextions as our Soldiers are, besides many of the Saylors have been taught, the Superiority of the British Navy officers, to all others in [the] world. Sir, There is no entrenching, or covering behind Trees at Sea. Superior Force or address only must determine the Victory, if the engagement once commences. You are not to measure your expectations of the Success of this Fleet, against the men of war, by the Success of our Troops against the King's, or the Success of our Cruizers against Transports. you may be now ready to ask me, are we then never to send our armed Vessels against the men of war, because they have been Superior to all the world with equal Force at Sea. Yes. But the first experiment, should not be made, where there is danger of the force being near equal, before your officers and men are practised in Sea engagements. If it is, our american Fleet I fear will not be long in our Posesion. I know that so much depends on address, & preparation founded on experience, that I tremble for the Consequences. A small omition determines the fate of a Sea engagement. I speak with confidence, because it is from experience. It has been the business of my life. A Superior force at Sea, divided in different Bottoms, is not equal to two thirds of it in fewer, because if one or two of the Small Vessels, on which the force is estimated should be disabled, the disparity against that side becomes instantly great. I have seen this Position exemplified, at the age of 14, when one Million of Dollars was depending, and Since cast about for the principle. Three things must be attended to in equiping this Fleet, if they are designed to act against the Enemy on this Coast, at this Stormy Season. They must be able to carry a stiff sail. This does not depend so much on their being deep loaded, as on the Center of Gravity being properly placed, in stowing them, for they may be deep in the water, and Yet carry but a small sail, owing to the Center of gravity being too high. They must not be loaded deep, for if they are, they will not be able to come up with a weak Enemy, in good Sailing Trim, nor escape from a stronger one. The officers, mariners and marines should be exercised in their Stations, with the Cannon and musketry with Powder, before they quit the river; as they may soon expect the enemy, and stormy weather may deprive them of that advantage, before they engage. One Ton of Powder however scarce it may be, properly expended in this way, will save Five in an engagement, if not save the Fleet. New and hasty sea armaments meet cruizing Ships, of near their Force on very unequal ground. The former is generally all confusion and not properly aranged; the Latter in order, and ready for action. ² Hence it was that the Privateers fitted out of France the last warr fell so easy a Prey to our Frigates, altho the Ships of the Former were Superior in size, men and Guns to ours. The same thing frequently happened to their Cruzers in the West Indies, when they came out of Port, Expresly to take ours Cruizing in their Sight. I have wrote you in the confidence of Friendship, and from an anxiety for the Cause of our bleeding Country; and not with any intention the [sic to] lessen the merit of any of the Gentlemen, who command these Vessels. I am in Haste [&c.]