My Lord,

I find myself as much at a loss, as I ever was in my life, how to apologise for giving your Lordship the trouble of this. Yet when I take the liberty of reminding you my Lord, that I agreed to the request which the Governour & president of North Carolina made me of coming over, from the impulse of the attatchment I have to.my Country, when from this Motive I say I tore myself from my dearest connections & subjected myself to all the inconveniences of a long sea voyage, I may venture to hope your Lordship will beleive, what I am going to say, proceeds from motives which at least deserve no blame.

From the conversation which passd at your Lordships office on Monday, I understood, that a new Idea, for employing the troops, destined for the Southern provinces, had been taken up. I heard the advantages & disadvantages of the different modes of acting with those troops agitated, with much Satisfaction. I did little more than listen, but I listened with attention. I have canvassed that subject in my own mind very often; I have ruminated on what pass'd on Monday ever since, without ever having left my room. I think myself called upon, by the duty I owe to the trust reposed in me, to lay the result of my reasonings, upon the subject before your Lordship.

In the memorial I had the honour of putting into your Lordships hands, ² I endeavourd to give an Idea of many particulars, which only can be learned upon the spot. That was a part of my task, I could venture upon with some confidence. Your Lordships enquiries led me to go further: to answer them as far as possible I went beyond my line, and pointed out what occurred to me as necessary upon the supposition of a body of troops being landed at Cape fear

It seems there are doubts of the practicability of carrying Ships of deep draught over Cape fear barr. I dare not presume, to dispute that point. I allways understood it was a better barr than that of Charlestown, I have been at a good deal of pains to ascertain the fact, which stands upon the information of three gentlemen now in London, who have all been Merchants on that river and are agreed, that the depth of water, both at high & low water on the barr, is greater than I have stated it to your Lordship, in my former memorial. That there is depth of water up to the ffiatts, for any vessel that can come over the barr, I can affirm.

I stated, my oppinion of the practicability, of forming a junction betwixt the back country people who have engaged to join GoverrMartin, and the troops proposed to be sent into the Country. I even ventured to give my oppinion of the steps necessary to be taken, to carry it into execution. I said the ground behind Brunswick town, was proper for an encampment & gave my reasons for saying so. I farther mentioned that by sending a couple of light ships, properly armed, up to Wilmington, that they would in a great measure cut off all communication betwixt the east and west sides of the river.

I gave my reasons for supposing the Govr could depend upon the people who had engaged to join him: and my reasons also for beleiving, that numbers from other parts of the province would join, so soon as they found they could do it, with any prospect of success.

If the troops should be sent to Charlestown, in my humble apprehension the consequences will be very different. Larger ships cannot go in. But I will take it for granted, that the troops are able to land, in the face of all the force the people have raisd; and that they can establish themselves, in the island or even in the town perfectly secure against every attempt of the enemy: and that if it should be thought proper, to reembark the troops and send them to [St.] Augustine it can be carried into execution. After possessing, all these advantages, let us look a moment at the consequences

I have not sufficient information of the state of South Carolina, but never having heard, that any association had been formed by the friends of government, or any offers or promises of assistance made to the Govemour, I should fear extremly that tho' a military force might possess themselves of Charlestown, that it never could be of any use in such a situation, for reducing the province to obedience. ー If it cannot extent its operations much further, in place of doing good, the expedition, will only serve to raise the spirits of the rebells & to sink every hope of releif in the well affected. I have indeed heard that in the back settlements of South Carolina, there are many friends to Government, but they are at a great distance from Charlestown, & could they be embodied, they must march thro' a country, every pass of which is already in the hands of the rebels. Every man in the province, who is in the power or under the influence of the rebells, will be instantly round Charlestown and there can be little doubt, that a few days will bring them reinforcements, from North Carolina, as they will have nothing to fear at home.

If the troops after entering the harbour, should even without attempting a landing, bear away to the southward, the effects, must be still worse, by convincing friends & foes, they were unequal to the Service. Should they go to Georgia and reduce that province to obedience, the advantage is so small to Government, and the loss to the general Confederacy so insignificant, that it will still afford matter of triumph to the rebells, that the troops could do no more.

The Ringleaders every where will make the proper use of the ill success of the troops; they will influence the minds of the Country Gentlemen, with high notions of their own valour & their own consequence: And they in their tum will pervert or confirm, in disloyalty the poor people settled rnund them in the woods. The natural consequence of all this will be, to prove the truth of an old observation, Possunt quia possevidentur. The Rebels, who are now filled with diffidence and distrust of themselves, will become formidable by beleiving themselves superior to the troops.

My fears, my Lord, have pointed out to me, these consequences, from an unsuccessfull attempt on South Carolina. On the other hand I dare not venture to say, that things remain on the same footing they did in North Carolina, when I left it, or even much later. But I still flatter myself, that the Gentlemen intrusted by the Governour, with the plan of bringing the people together, have managed matters so as to be yet able to accomplish it.

Here then my Lord, is at least a reasonable hope of success, it bids as fair as any thing can do. And if it shall even be found, upon landing the troops, that the rebells have taken such measures as will prevent a junction with the well affected, the expedition to the southward will be very little retarded. And if the troops do succeed here, an expedition to South Carolina, cannot fail of being attended with the most happy consequences. The back settlers in South Carolina and in those parts bordering on the south western parts of North Carolina are said to be well affected: Be master of North Carolina, nothing can be more certain or more easy, than sending troops into the well affected parts of South Carolina, & marching them to Charlestown in spite of any opposition could be brought against them: more especialy if a small force was then sent into Charlestown harbour.

There is one thing further I beg leave to mention, which is the oppinion that Governour Martin holds, of the strength to be expected in his province. He thinks himself sure of being able to keep up his authority, was it once reestablished without the assistance of the regular troops. I wish one could be sure of the same thing in South Carolina.

These appear to me to be the advantages and disadvantages, attending making the proposed attempt, in South or in North Carolina. I consider it as my indispensible duty to lay them before your Lordship, in conformity to the trust reposed in me.

It is but too common, for people to wish to promote, a particular plan, in opposition to every other however advantagious. If I know myself my Lord this is not the Case with me. This subject has been familiar to my thoughts for many months past. The result of my reasoning upon it, is what I have stated. I have not the vanity even to wish to entrude my oppinions, but charged as I am with what I consider as a very high trust, I could not acquit myself to my own feelings, if I should neglect stating to your Lordship whatever occurs to me on the subject. I have the honour to be [&c.]

Orange Street [London]
8 November 1775.

[P.S.] After finishing my letter, I met with the inclosed rates of pilotage for Cape fear river, as established by Act of Assembly, which prove incontestibly, that ships drawing Eighteen feet water, can readily pass the barr. I consider it of much consequence, to have such a proof of the practicability of the attempt, be the success of it, what it may.

[Enclosure]

Rates of Pilotage, established by Act of Assembly for Cape fear River in North Carolina. ー

And it be enacted by the Authority aforesaid that any pilot appointed to pilot Vessels from Brunswick to Wilmington & back, shall and may receive one half of the above rates. And if only to the flatts, and back to Brunswick, then one fourth of the said rates, respect being had to the particular draught of water such vessel shall draw