Sir,

The late freezing Weather haviiig formed some pretty strong Ice from Dorchester Point to Boston Neck, and from Roxbury to the Common, thereby affording a more expanded, and consequently a less dangerous Approach to th[is] Town, I could not help thinking, notwithstanding the Militia were not all come in, and we had little or no Powder to begin our Operations by a regular Cannonade and Bombardment, that a bold & resolute Assault upon the Troops in Boston with such Men as we had (for it could not take many Men to guard our own Lines at a Time when the Enemy were attacked in all Quarters,) might be crowned with Success; and therefore seeing no certain Prospect of a Supply of Powder on the one Hand, and [a] certain Dissolution of the Ice on the other, I called the General Officers together for their opinion (agreeably to the Resolve of Congress of 22d Decr) ²

The Result will appear in the enclosed Council of War, and being almost unanimous, I must suppose to be right, altho from a thorough Conviction of the Necessity of attempting something against the ministerial Troops before a Reinforcement should arrive, and while we were favoured with the Ice, I was not only ready, but willing and desirous of making the assault, under a firm Hope, if they Men would have stood by me of a favourable Issue, notwithstanding the Enemy's Advantage of Ground, [Art]illery &c.

Perhaps the Irksomness of my Situation may have given different Ideas to me, than those which influenced the Gentlemen I consulted, and might have inclined me to put more to the Hazard than was consistent with Prudence. If it had, I am not sensible of it, as I endeavoured to give it all the Consideration that a Matter of such Importance requird. True it is, I cannot help acknowledging, that I have many disagreeable Sensations on Account of my Situation; for to have the Eyes of the whole Continent fixed with anxious Expectation of hearing of some great Event, and to be restrain'd in every military Operation for Want of the necessary Means of carrying it on, is not very pleasing; especially as the Means used to conceal my Weakness from the Enemy, conceals it also from our Friends and adds to the Wonder.

I do not utter this by Way of Complaint. I am sensible that all that the Congress could do, they have done, and I should feel, most powerfully, the Weight of conscious Ingratitude, were I not to acknowledge this. But as we have Accounts of the Arrival of Powder in Capt [Thomas] Mason, ³ I should beg to have it sent on in the most expeditious Manner, otherwise we not only loose all Chance of the Benefits resulting from the Season, but of the Militia, which are brought in at a most enormous Expence upon a Presumption that we should long er'e this, been amply supplied with Powder under the Contracts entered into with the Committee of Congress.

The Militia, contrary to an express Requisition are come, and coming in, without Ammunition. To supply them alone with 24 Rounds, which is less by 3/5ths than the Regulars are served with, will take between 50 & 60 Barrels of Powder, and to complete the other Troops to the like Quantity will take near as much more, and leave in Store not more than 60 Barrels besides a few Rounds of Cannon Cartridges ready filled for Use. This Sir, Congress may be assured is a true State of Powder, and will I hope bear some Testimony of my Incapacity for Action in such a Way as may do any essential Service.