[Extract]

. . .The amazing advantage the Enemy derive from their Ships and the Command of the Water; keeps us in a State of constant perplexity and the most anxious conjecture. We are not yet informed of their destination, nor can any plausible conclusions be drawn respecting It — at least, not such as appear satisfactory. What renders the matter still more difficult & confused, is their extreme inactivity & delay. For it is certain they began to embark immediately after the evacuation of Amboy and now remain be­ tween the Narrows & the Hook or were there, when I was last advised upon the Subject — I have Two Active Officers with an Escort now out, for the purpose of Intelligence and for reconnoitring their situation from Fort Lee and along the River in that Neighbourhood. Things being thus circumstanced and various Opinions, as to their real Object, prevailing among us, Some supposing it to be Philadelphia — Others the North River and Others an Expedition more Easterly, I would submit it to Congress, Whether the Militia of the Neighbouring Counties should not be immediately called to the first or at Chester — the Lower Coundes at Wilmington. This measure appears to me highly expedient and no Objection can lie against it of sufficient validity to prevent it, As a few days must certainly determine their real designs. Should they be against Philadelphia and they have favourable Winds, their voyage will be made in a short time, when it may be too late to obtain their [the militia] aid & to arrange them properly for defence, supposing 'em to come in. I am the more induced to recommend this measure, as the Several objects we have to attend to, necessarily oblige this Army to continue at a considerable distance from that place, till their Intentions are better understood; And as they might by a sudden and rapid push, attempt to effect some material & capital stroke, before we could get there, unless there is a respectable force to oppose 'em. . . .