At 6 this Morning two of the French ships in the Narraganset passage got under way, and stood down towards the Fleet. At 8 one of them anchored half way down the back of Connonicut. The other joined the ship which lies nearest off the Mouth of the harbour. This movement gives us hopes that they have received intelligence of the approach of Lord Howe, and are drawing their line of Battle ships together. The rest of the Fleet continue in the usual position. . . . 

Many large boats, with Troops, tents, Stores, &c. &c. came to Howland's ferry this day from Taunton River, and behind Mount Hope. Few or no people appear opposite Fogland, or to the Southward of it, but about Howland's all the houses are full of Troops. . . .

Small armed Sloops or Boats have been dispatched almost every night since the arrival of the French fleet, with letters to Lord Howe and Sir Henry Clinton, giving them information of our situation as well as that of the Enemy. Some of them will doubtless arrive safe. 

The Marines of The Frigates are now embodied under the Command of Captain Coutts of that Corps.¹ They are encamped by themselves, and take a part of the duty of The town, amounting to 1 Captain 2 Sub^s and 60 men. 

We are all extremely anxious for some account from Lord Howe or a sight of his fleet, in the Offing. If he has the number of Ships with him which we are told he has, and is acquainted with the position of the Enemy's fleet, we think he will soon appear. When we reflect how much is at stake, we cannot pretend to blame him for not seeking the Enemy until the force of his fleet gives him a certainty of success. If he should, by a precipitate attack, be defeated in an action with the French fleet, the consequences are obvious and dreadful;—no less than the certain loss of this Island and the Force on it, and probably that of a great part of our troops in America, as by losing our superiority at Sea, the Enemy would have it in their power to deprive us of all supplies from Europe, and the posts we hold in the Vicinity of New York could not afford subsistence for the Troops there for three Months. The loss of a great part of our Naval force in America, and that of a large fleet of transports, attending the Army, which would necessarily follow a defeat of our fleet, would lay the Nation under almost insurmountable difficulties, and throw such a damp upon the spirits of the people at home as might lead to the loss of our American Colonies. As Admiral Byron is daily expected on the Coast with a fleet of large ships, and as from our force and situation we may be expected to make considerable efforts and prolong the defence of this Garrison, we cannot blame Lord Howe for waiting to be joined by such a number of Admiral Bryon's ships as will give him a decided superiority over the Enemy's fleet.² He would deserve censure should he make a precipitate attack on the Enemy, and hazard so much, when by waiting for a short time he may have it in his power to give a capital blow to the Naval power of France, & the hopes of America. It seems to be the general opinion that the French [fleet] is in a very dangerous position, should Lord Howe appear with a Superior Fleet, as the Wind now stands. It is conceived that in that case, their safety would consist of forcing their way into this harbour. 

I think it may with safety be averred, that if our force now in the Island, is drawn together within the position which The General³ has determined to take for our defence, we may, by a proper exertion of it, bid defiance for at least ten or twelve days to the united force which may be brought against us. There can be no doubt but Lord Howe will appear before the end of that period. . . .

With such a considerable extent of Coast to defend without shipping of any kind, and the practicability of the Rebels landing a considerable force on Common fence & Howland's Necks, without our being able to prevent them, we cannot expect to repel the attacks of the Enemy should they make them in several places at once. A complete defeat of one attack would not prevent the success of others; and by our waiting to repulse the attack which would be made on the most advanced part of the Island, the other attacks on our flanks would gain the time they would require to cut across our rear, and prevent our retreat to the town. Any attack made from Bristol or Howland's ferry, will be false, and intended to amuse us, while troops land behind us; for we cannot suppose that the Rebels will attack several Redoubts defended by British troops, and fight their way the whole length of the Island, when they have it in their power to land within 3 miles of our Lines, under cover of the French ships, and have a Battalion at most to oppose them. It is probable their plan is, to make two principal landings, one on the E. side near Holmes's, and the other on the W. side near Stoddard's. The position of the French ships in the passages seems to favor this opinion. It is probable a false attack would be made about two hours before daybreak on our advanced posts at Bristol-ferry, Common-fence, and Howland's bridge, which would take off our attention from the principal attacks, which would land about day break, and immediately endeavor to form across the Island, and possess the roads leading to town. Their having the entire command of the water renders this very practicable; and the consequences are obvious. The two Regiments at Windmill-hill dare not quit their post without the utmost hazard; and before the whole could be assembled in order to retire in a body to Newport, the Enemy on the E. & W. sides would be in possession of the position they intended to take; and the General would not have time, nor could he venture, to move with any considerable part of the troops from the town to take a post to cover our retreat. Our situation will appear more dangerous and critical if the French fleet should at the same time force their entrance into the harbour, and make an attack on the town. 

We may generally form a judgement of the Enemy's intentions by what is obviously his interest to do. In this case it is to divide our force, if possible cut off a part of it, and to accelerate the reduction of Newport. Our great object should therefore be, to collect our force in due time, which will render us formidable, give us confidence, and enable us to make every possible effort to protract the defence of the post committed to our charge. Every hour we keep the Enemy off is of the utmost consequence; as it gives time to Lord Howe to collect his force and appear before the Enemy's fleet; and we all have such confidence in His Lordships zeal and abilities, that we are satisfied he will do all that is possible for the relief of this place, upon which so much depends. Should we, by injudicious measures, or a weak defence, fall into the power of the Enemy before he has done what is possible for our relief, we must lose our honor for ever.