[Extract]

...in the ports, work is proceeding with the utmost haste on the construction, repair and outfitting of the vessels whose commissioning has been ordered. The number of these last has just been increased by three ships of 74 guns, to wit, the Invi[n]cible, the Elizabeth, and the Prince of Wales. The Admiralty's order specifies that they are to stand guard duty in the ports. Since ships of this firepower can be directed only against us, the only question remaining to be answered is whether these preparations are offensive or defensive: that is, whether England is merely keeping pace with her neighboring powers. You, Monseigneur, are inclined to the latter hypothesis; and I confess that I too shall be so inclined, so long as I do not see impressment put into effect. If this measure is used, I shall be convinced that these people are no longer bluffing and that we have really become their prime target. Thereupon I shall consider war inevitable and shall tum all my thoughts in that direction, rejecting all speculation to the contrary as useless and likely only to lead me into error.

I am keenly aware, Monseigneur, how important it would be for the King's Service to be informed in advance of the British Council's decision on this matter. I very much doubt that any firm one has as yet been taken; and the trouble is that in such cases, cause is swiftly followed by effect. Since the slightest rumor of impressment causes all seamen to take flight, the Government is always extremely careful not to reveal its intention. Very little time is required to have orders signed by the principal magistrate of each locality and to prepare some lighters or other small vessels suitable for carrying them out; proclamation and execution are performed at one and the same time. At sea, even this formality is unnecessary. Under Admiralty orders, the King's ships simply stop merchant vessels and seize most of their crews....But neither should we think that impressment will take effect quickly enough to provide any great attack forces here. Although the secrecy of the operation may procure a large number of men at the outset, progress soon slows down when the alarm is spread. Furthermore, the fleets are never more poorly manned than by impressment, which always catches many more landsmen than mariners. The greatest source of manpower would be that of seamen from coaling vessels, who number about twelve thousand. But since the subsistence of London depends on them, they would not be taken except in dire extremity...

There is in [Portsmouth] at present a fleet of 25 transport vessels, some for Halifax and some for Quebec. This fleet will sail with the first favorable wind, escorted by the frigates Richmond and Mermaid and the sloops Vulture and Hunter. In six weeks from now there will scarcely be a frigate fit for commissioning left in the ports. The same is true of corvettes. As soon as one is built, she is put into commission. The sloop Dispatch at Deptford, and one called the Swift at Portsmouth are cases in point. They are barely launched, and their commissioning has already been ordered. Despite the considerable number of these frigates and corvettes, which may be regarded as the Navy's light troops and which are all being employed in America, American privateers continue to capture prizes rather frequently.... I have no doubt that these privateers will appear in the Channel this winter and will make themselves very troublesome to English shipping.