[Extract]

. . . England's situation (should she lose these Colonies) is such that in a short time it would be reduced to being the most ridiculous power in Europe. The King, the Nation, the Minister, all have an equal interest in making the most determined effort possible to subjugate the Americans, or at least to make new attempts, and try to earn time. And in fact I notice that this is their present policy, as any means of reconciliation is desperate after what has happened.

I know that the British Minister has chartered or tried to charter from the King of Denmark eight or ten warships. The cancellation of the order for Wiirttemberg troops, I believe, will be followed by another cancellation for Brunswick troops, and from Hesse, but such countermanding does not mean, it seems to me, that they have given up the enterprize; rather that they have changed their operational plan. That is, I believe that they will have that corps of troops which they now have in America, without increasing it, but not ordering its return, and that they will carry on a sea war with maximum force against the Rebels, by keeping many warships on cruises in order w prevent their privateers from acquiring reserves of weapons there, and from preying upon English vessels, as they do.

England knows, or should know, that the Rebels have 124 privateers which up to this time have seized 250 ships formerly serving in the West Indies trade, and have become formidable by so doing.

By placing on station a number of ships of the line and frigates they [the English] can hope to maintain communication with their southern settlements, and with that number of troops ashore to be left in the provinces of Philadelphia or the Jerseys, they will compel the enemy to keep an army active, and will deprive him in part, if not entirely, of those munitions and products he might obtain for himself by trade or privateering. . . .

Paris 17 March 1777