The position of England with regard to her colonies in North America, and the possible and probable consequences of the result, whatever it may be, of that quarrel, deserves, without doubt, in every respect, the most serious attention on the part of France and Spain. The political calculations which can be formed regarding this great crisis are indeed such, that it is problematic whether they [France and Spain] should desire the subjection or the independence of the English colonies, and they are threatened, in either hypothesis, with dangers which it is not perhaps in the power of human foresight to anticipate or to avert.

We shall not enter into the discussion which the development of these reflections would require; we shall limit ourselves to making them evident, observing that, if, on the one hand, the continuation of the war may be regarded as infinitely advantageous to the two Crowns, since it will exhaust both victors and vanquished, on the other hand it may be feared, 1st. That the English Ministry, feeling the insufficiency of its means, may consent to a reconciliation; 2nd., that the King of England, in conquering English America may make an instrument of it to subjugate likewise European England; 3rd., that the English Ministry, beaten on the continent of America, may seek an indemnity at the expense of France and Spain, which would at once efface their shame, and give them the means of reconciliation with the insurgents, to whom it would offer the trade and provisioning of the Isles; 4th., that the colonies, having become independent, and preserving no tie with England, may become conquerors from necessity, and that, surcharged with goods, they may seek a forced outlet in the sugar islands, and in Spanish America, which would destroy the ties which attach our colonies to the mother country.

These different suppositions may almost equally lead to .a war more or less distant with France and Spain. The first, because with the forces which the Court of London has prepared, it may be tempted to employ them in the too easy conquest which the West Indies offer to it. The second, because the subjection of the mother country could only be effected by flattering the national hatred and jealousy by a war, the duration of which would fit her for the yoke, and the successes of which would ensure it; lastly, the third, by despair and by the necessity of saving the heads of the Ministry, and perhaps even the person of the King from the rage of the English people, by procuring for them a conquest useful as well as brilliant, which would spare the shame of an arrangement patched up by an acquisition which would be the price of victory, the compensation for defeat, or the pledge of reconciliation.

Such is, indeed, the state of the colonies of the two nations, that, with the exception, perhaps, of Havannah, none is in a position to resist the least part of the forces which England is sending to America, and the physical possibility of the conquest appears but too evident.

As to the moral probability of an unprovoked invasion, and which would be contrary to public faith and to treaties, it would be a strange mistake to believe the English susceptible of being restrained by such motives; neither gratitude nor a just reciprocity of polite attentions would have more power over them than the sacred laws of morality. They appear to applaud ours only with a sort of derision. Experience has but too well proved that they believe everything just and honourable which they regard as advantageous to their nation, and destructive to their rivals. We know the maxims of most of their statesmen, who do not calculate the actual harm France does them, but that which she. may one day be able to do them. They feel that if England is exhausted by the present war, and France and Spain take the measures which their power and wisdom prescribe to them, they will find themselves, at the end of the fight, unable to struggle against these two Powers. Already has this reflection been made; already has the Opposition appeared to unite, in these general maxims, with the present Ministry; already there is reason to fear that the latter, feeling its weakness, may seize the only means of getting out of the labyrinth in which it is involved, by giving up the reins to the Opposition, and Lords Chatham, Shelburne, Weymouth, Sandwich and Richmond will expect alike to maintain their popularity, and, by coming to an agreement with America, and by employing the enormous mass of forces set in motion, to prevail in rectifying the conditions of the last Treaty of Peace, against which they have not ceased to rise up implacably. The English of all parties appear to be unanimously persuaded that a popular war against France, or the invasion of Mexico, would end, or at least lull, their domestic disputes, and extinguish their national debt.

In the midst of so many dangers, the lovely preference which the King and the King of Spain have for the preservation of peace, seems to prescribe most measured steps. If the disposition of these two princes were warlike, if they were disposed to give way to the impulse of their interests, and perhaps to the justice of their cause, which is that of humanity, so often offended by England; if their military and pecuniary means were at the point of development and energy proper and proportionate to their effective power, it would be necessary doubtless to tell them that Providence has marked this moment for the humiliation of England, has struck her with the blindness which is the most certain precursor of destruction, and that it is time to avenge on that nation the ills which since the beginning of the century, she has caused to those who have had the misfortune to be her neighbours or her rivals; it would then be necessary to neglect none of the means possible to render the coming campaign as vigorous as can be, and procure some advantages for the Americans. The degree of fury and exhaustion of the two parties which would result from it would then determine the moment to strike some decisive blows, which would cause England to return to the rank of secondary powers; would take from her the empire which she claims to exercise in the four quarters of the world with so much pride and injustice, and would deliver the universe from a rapacious tyrant who wishes to swallow up at the same time all power and all riches.

But if that is not the point of view from which the two monarchs wish to regard matters, their role appears, in the present conjuncture, to be necessarily limited to a circumspect but active foresight.

If this principle is adopted, it will remain to decide what is the most suitable conduct to attain that end.

We should, it seems, before deciding, establish some results from the succinct outline which has just been drawn. 1st. We must avoid compromising ourselves, and not provoke those evils which we wish to prevent; 2nd., we must not flatter ourselves, nevertheless, that the most absolute and rigorous inaction will guarantee us from all suspicion. We know that our present conduct is not exempt from it. The English, accustomed to be led by the impulse of their interests, and to judge of others by themselves, will always believe that we are not allowing such a good opportunity of injuring them to escape; even if they did not believe it, they would feign to do so, if they wanted to attack us, and Europe would be persuaded of the truth of their imputation, in spite of our denials.

3rd., the continuation of the war, at least for a year, appears desirable for the two Crowns, either because it is necessary that the forces which are going to America should find employment against the Colonies, or because the Ministry would necessarily change, if a reconciliation were to be made now, or because the English army, weakened by her victories or her defeats, will not be in a condition to undertake a vigorous enterprise, or finally, because a year gained for measures of vigour and foresight, may, in many respects, change the aspect of affairs. 4th., the most assured means of attaining this end would be, on one hand, to keep the English Ministry persuaded that the intentions of France and Spain are pacific, in order that it may not fear to embark in the operation of a brisk and expensive campaign; whilst on the other hand, we should sustain the courage of the Americans by some secret favours, and by vague hopes that would prevent the steps which it is sought to induce them to take for a reconciliation, and that would contribute to cause those ideas of independence to burst forth, which as yet are only secretly budding amongst them. The ills which the English cause them to experience will embitter their minds, they will be .all the more furious for war, and in the event of the mother countr.y being victorious, she would, for a long time, have need of all her strength to crush the spirit of independence of the Americans, and she would not dare to expose herself to the efforts they would make, combined with a foreign enemy, to recover their liberty.

If all these considerations were judged to be as true and solid as they are probable, the most natural inductions would seem to be: ー . 1st., That we should continue to feed with dexterity the security of the English Ministry as to the intentions of France and Spain.

2nd., That it would be desirable to give to the insurgents secret help in munitions, in. money, &c The presupposed utility would justify this small sacrifice,' and no reason of dignity or equity would be opposed to it. .

3rd., That it. would not accord with the King's dignity, nor'. with his interest, to enter into a compact with the insurgents. Some reflections taken from amongst. a crowd of others appear to prove it. That compact, indeed, could only be of value if they became i9dependent, and only so long as they found it to their interest not to break it, so long as the regime did not change to. an administration as unstable and which will necessarily be stormy, and finally, so long as the Act of Navigation did: not become the basis of a reuni<:m between the mother cou~try and th~colonies. Such an arrangement can,only be solidly founded on respective interest, and it seems that it would not be: time to examine this question until the liberty of English America had taken positive consistency.

4th., That if France and Spain give help, they must only seek the value of it in the momentary political end at which they aim, reserving to themselves to decide in the sequel according to events and conjunctures.

5th., Perhaps it might be necessary to consider, in good policy, that a too marked apathy in the present crisis will be interpreted as the effect of fear, and of that immoderate love of peace which, in the last few years, has produced so many evils and injustices, and that England, judging the lack of means and the pusillanimity which she supposed in us to guarantee each other, may become still more exacting than she is already, and that she may dare everything, either directly and openly, or by the insolence and injustice of her searches and cruises, and by insults of detail which she would not and could not atone for, and which we could not and would not brook. The English respect only those who can make themselves feared.

6th., The result which the collection and succession of these facts and reflections seem to present with most force, is the necessity of putting ourselves in a position which may either restrain the English, render their attacks uncertain, or ensure the means of punishing them. Measures of foresight, wisely combined, which would raise the effective and active forces of the two monarchies to the level of their real power, would at all times be useful and proper, but at a time when the public weal is in danger in so many ways, this foreseeing activity becomes indispensable. It appears to offer the only means which can at once efficaciously prevent possible evils, and repair those which we may not have been able to prevent, mote especially as of all the probable conjectures which circumstances may warrant, the least apparent is that peace can be preserved; whatever may be the result of the present war between England and her colonies.

Such are the principal points of view which this important problem admits of, and which we have simply proposed to indicate to the wisdom and penetration of the King and his Council.