The first object of our attention after landing [on Long Island] was to ascertain the Situation and depth of the Ford. But to our unspeakable mortification & disappointment we discovered that the Passage across the Channel which separates the two Islands was no where shallower at low water than seven feet instead of 18 Inches, which was the depth reported. This of course rendered it impracticable for the Troops to take that Share in the attack of the Fort on Sullivan's Island which had been at first intended, and was agreed on only under the Presumption of there being a Ford. For, having only fifteen flat bottomed Boats left, not more than 700 Men with the asistance of every additional aid could be thrown on shore at a Time. And these would have to land thro' a high Surff in face of an Intrenchment well lined with musketry exceeding themselves in Number; exposed at the same time to a heavy fire from Batteries of Cannon as they rowed up, without a possibility of being covered while landing by either Battery, Frigate, armed Ship, Galley, or Gun boat. After this, even if they could effect a landing, they would have their ground to maintain under every Disadvantage, while the Boats were returning and bringing back another freight of Troops. Consequently the Attempt appeared to the General Officers as well as myself so full of temerity, that it was resolved on the 18th (which was the soonest we were certain of the fact) to send Brigadier General [John] Vaughan to the Commodore to state our Situation & consult with him upon the best Means of employing the Troops under these Circumstances in support of the attack by the Kings Ships whenever he should judge proper to begin it. General Vaughan was likewise directed to offer to the Commodore two Battalions to act on his Side, if he and General Vaughan (who was to command them) thought they could be covered in their landing and were likely to be of any essential Service.

It may well be supposed that I suffered no small uneasiness on seeing myself thus enticed by delusive Information, which offered an important object to my Grasp, to turn my face to the South, so contrary to the opinion I had but a few days before given to both the Minister & Commander in Chief; then drawn on in its Pursuit by unforeseen delays and accidents considerably beyond the time I had prescribed to myself or the Tenor of my Instructions admitted; and now after all likely to be foiled by this discovery, which from the confident assurances I had received there could not have been the slightest suspicion of.

Sir Peter Parker, in the answer he sent me by General Vaughan on the 21st, seemed to imply that he thought himself fully equal to the attempt with the Ships alone, and only expected from the Troops the best Cooperation in their Power when he made it. The 23d of June was accordingly named for the day of action. Unfortunately Contrary Winds prevented the Ships from moving for some days; whereby the Rebels had time to perfect another Battery and Intrenchment that was begun on the 22d. This being 500 yards back from their first Position on the Point, in very strong Ground with a much more extended front, having a Battery on the right and a Morass on the left, &: abattis in front obligd us to make an entire Change in the Plan of operations on our Side. For it was apparent, that the few men I had Boats for, advancing singly through a narrow channel uncovered & unprotected, could not now attempt a landing without a manifest Sacrifice. Lord Cornwallis & I therefore took some Pains to explain & point out the Circumstances of our Situation to Mr Whitworth (one of Sir Peter Parkers Lieutenants), supposing that his Description (from having been on the Spot) might make the Commodore more clearly sensible of them, than any we could send him in a Letter. We at the same time informed him that the Troops could now do nothing more in Support of his attack than to cause a Diversion as occurrences should arrise; and that we should probably with this View land on the main apportée for an attack on the Rebel Battery at Haddrells Point, if the Commodore would be pleased to send a few Frigates to the Westward to enfilade the Communication between the Main & Sullivans Island. The Commodore in his answer to this Message, says,

[Here is inserted an extract from Parker's letter of June 25, 1776]

This letter was also accompanied by some Signals, by which I was to know when the Battery was silenced, when the Commodore took Possession of the Fort, when he landed his Seamen & Marines, and in short everything he was about.

I have transcribed these Extracts from Sir Peter Parkers Letter only to shew; that he expected nothing more from the Army, than a Descent on the Main in Cooperation with the Frigates he was to send to the Westward, and a Detachment from it to receive the Fort from his Seamen and Marines after he had silenced the Batteries with his Ships and taken Possession; which he seemed not to entertain the least doubt they alone were capable of effecting without the assistance of the Troops, or he certainly would have accepted the offer I made him of two Battalions to act under General Vaughan on his side. But how much soever I might have differed from Sir Peter Parker in opinion with respect to the facility of this acquisition, and the mode of accomplishing it; I could not explain to him my Sentiments on the Subject more fully than I had already done. I had now therefore only to wait his Hour of attack, and hold my few Boats &: Troops in readiness to catch at advantages as they should happen to offer in the Course of it ー intending in the mean time to make every Demonstration of landing that was likely to deceive the Enemy, until an opportunity should occur thro' the Cooperation of the Frigates of doing so effectually on the main, and thereby supporting the attack of the Squadron to the full extent of our abilities. And I was not indeed altogether without Hopes that our joint Efforts might even yet provesuccessfull if the Ships should bring up as near the Fort as the pilots assured Sir Peter Parker in my hearing Presence was possible (about 70 yards); as the fire from the Ships Tops being so much above the Enemys Works would probably at that distance soon drive raw Troops (such as those assembled there were certainly at that time) from their guns, and it was not unlikely that our moving into their rear at that critical Moment might cause them suddenly to evacuate the Island.