The committee appointed to confer with General Lee respecting the defence of New York, brought in their report, which was read: Whereupon,

The command of the passage of the Sound must be ours. this I imagine is already effected by the works thrown up at Horne Hook; but as a farther security, batteries and a redoubt must be erected on the other side, either in [Montresor] Island or on the Continent of Long Island, as the Engineer and succeeding General shall determine. these additional works are not solely meant to shut up to the Enimy the passage through the sound, but to secure a free open and easy communication to our own Troops betwixt the Continent of New York and Long Island. As the City of New York is almost environ'd by navigable waters it is undoubtedly very difficult to fortify it against a powerful sea armament; but still I am of opinion that although Troops cannot easily be prevented landing under the Guns of their shipping, they may be prevented lodging themselves in it, or converting it into a great place of arms as they have done at Boston. the East River, I am almost persuaded, may be secur'd in such a manner that their Ships will scarcely venture into it, or at least they cannot keep their stations when in. a Battery for this purpose is plan'd and in some forwardness at the foot of the Jews burying ground, to protect this Battery from the near approach of Ships (which when close are always supposed to be an over match for Batteries level with the water and in a low situation) Guns in barber placed on the heights of the Jews burying ground, when in correspondence with a Battery I have ordered on an opposite commanding knoll in Long Island, will certainly be sufficient. these two fires will likewise be cross'd by a third of very considerable range from a work in the front of our trench'd Camp in Long Island, which work is likewise answered by a Battery sunk in a celler on the opposite Wharfe. such is our plan with respect to the east River, haveing attentively examined the Fort and great Batteries under it and consider'd whether they cou'd be of any possible use to us. I am of opinion that as Ships of great Burthen can approach so near the latter it will be dangerious if not impracticable to support them.

The Fort cannot for the same reason be defended, but as it is not possible in our hands to render it a fortification of offence against the Enimy, it might in their possession be converted into a Citadel to keep. the Town in subjection. These .considerations have induc'd me to throw down the north East and North West Bastions, with the communicating Curtain, so that being entirely open behind, and a commanding Traverse thrown across the Broad Way with three Guns mounted, it is impossible for the Enimy to lodge themselves in and repair the Fort. The north River is so extremely wide and deep that it is in vain to think of any means to prevent the men of war commanding the navigation of it, but it does not appear to me, that they have it in their power to annoy dangerously the Town, much less to destroy it, It is true an accidental shell may do great mischief, but the effects of their Cannon are not I think much to be apprehended for there is a most fortunate ridge of Eminence which not only serves as a screen of protection for the Town but on which any number of Batteries may be erected to keep the Ships at a distance. I must observe once for all that New York from its circumstances can with difficulty be made a regular tenable fortification, but it may be made a most advantageous field of Battle, so advantageous indeed, that if our people behave with common spirit, and the Commanders are men of discretion, it must cost the Enimy many thousands of men to get possession of it. The Streets must be traversed and barricadoed, so as to prevent their coming on our Flanks. three Redoubts thrown up on the three eminences Judge Jones, Bayards Hill, and either Lispenards or Haldermans house on Hudsons River, but these measures are not to be confin'd to the Town, the whole Island is to be redoubted in certain regular steps. (if I may so express it) quite to Kings Bridge, these redoubts redans or Fliches are such, easily thrown up and are no expense. the leading roads from Hudsons River whence the Enimy can alone approach must be obstructed to artillery. Kings Bridge must be strongly fortified to preserve the communication free and open with Connecticut, on which Province you can alone depend for succours of men, for the Breadth and depth of the north River renders the Communication with Jersey too precarious. The possession and security of Long Island is certainly of still greater importance than New York. I have accordingly marked out a Camp fortified by a Chain of Redoubts mutually supporting each other, and which also corresponding with the Batteries on the New York side will prevent the Enimies entering or remaining in the east River. This Camp is intended to contain four or five thousand men; upon the whole for the defence of Long Island and New York eight thousand, at least, regular Troops will be necessary. with respect to the Fort on Hudsons River in the high Land I must refer the Congress to the report of Capt. Smith who was sent up to examine and who is extremely capable to judge and advise. I have now in a military capacity to the best of my recollection mentioned every circumstance relative to the Defence and security of New York and Long Island, but think it my duty to observe that all these measures will be totally fruitless unless some precautions are taken with respect to the profess'd Enimies of American Liberty nested in the very spots where they can do the greatest mischief Queens County and Staten Island. The Bonds they have given are too ridiculous to be mentioned, the association they have signed they consider as forced upon 'em, and consequently null. When our own Troops are obliged to remain inactive from want of arms, when from this deficiency the Canada Expedition is at a stand, New York and Long Island left open to the invasions of the Enimy, is it not a most dangerious neglect, omission, or rather unaccountable infatuation, to suffer considerable Bodies of avowed Foes to be possessed of arms for your destruction? what possible advantage can result from such a false delicacy? I wou'd therefore humbly propose that the Inhabitants of Statten Island shou'd without loss of time be disarm'd and their arms delivered to some Regiment already raised but unfurnished with muskets. I do not imagine that the disarming the Tories will incapacitate them from acting against us, as they can easily be supplied by the Ships. I shou'd therefore think it prudent to secure their Children as Hostages if a measure of this kind (hard as it may appear) is not adopted, the Childrens Children of america may rue the fat al omission.
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2. This so-called report, which is simply a recording of Lee's views, is in the handwriting of William Whipple, one of the committee of Congress. A few words are added by the general himself. The Whipple copy is in the Papers CC (Other Reports of Committees of Congress), 21, 11, NA. The report occasioned an order for eight thousand men to be sent to the defense of New York, and that the conventions, committees of safety, assemblies of the various colonies be urged to disarm all disaffected persons, and that the arms so taken be used to arm the Continental troops and militia.