[Extract]
My lord,

When we consider the forces of a Nation we ordinarily distinguish her own from those she derives from her alliances. The combination of these means is the measure of her power and determines to what degree she may impress rival nations. I doubt that, if England considers us under both these views, she will find the balance to tip in her favor. But I shall leave these speculations to her competence. I shall limit myself to look for her interest, her views, her means, her undertakings. Today I propose, My lord, to call to your attention the condition of her forces.

When considering the political situation of England, we find this Power to b without system, without liaison, without purpose, and almost without any influence on the Continent, with the exception of Portugal whose alliance, useful to her trade in time of peace, would be a burden in time of war. We see her fighting the difficulty of governing far away possessions with eccentric agitation, while the different parts of her empire act upon one another in order to destroy one another.

If, from there, we look over her means, we find from the progress of the present war that everything points to the insufficient resources of England in men and money in order to sustain a prolonged war at sea. The extraordinary inducements for the levy of sailors, the permission to use foreigners on merchant ships, the quality of military crews where real sailors are in proportion of less than 1 to 3 do not indicate a superabundance of means in this area. On shore, the difficulty of finding recruits due to a shortage of men which was openly confessed in Parliament by the Secretary of War, compels this Power to import foreign troops at great expense; the impossibility to face such an expensive undertaking even by using all her revenue places her in such a position that she must increase taxes and issue new Government bonds. Such behavior should surprise rather than alarm the rival powers of England, especially when we observe that her use of the resources which she exhausts, or the charges which she multiplies can only bring about the ruin of the country from which this country pretends to draw the bulk of her commerce by open force.

Following this survey, there remains for us to consider more especially the present state of her forces at sea as well as on land. This is the subject of the tables No 1 and No 2.² The first one will interest you more since England is detached from the Continent not only by her policy but also by her geographic situation and can be considered only as a maritime Power divided over several parts of the world and of which the real center is the Sea itself.

You will undoubtedly observe, My lord, that the ships in activity and those ready to be activated at the first order constitute the essential part of the Navy. If to these two columns consisting of 67 Ships of the line mounting from 100 to 50 guns inclusively, 62 Frigates mounting from 44 to 20 guns inclusively and 55 ships mounting less than 20 guns, we add the ships requiring average repairs, consisting of 25 Ships of the line, 5 Frigates and one Sloop, we see that the foundation of the English Navy consists of 92 Ships of the line, 67 Frigates and 56 ships of less importance, or a total of 2i5 sails. Since these are the real forces that we would have to fight, should we be at war, it seems to me that we should make our plans on the basis of this foundation upon which we must properly fix our attention.

It is not enough to ascertain that it exists. We must also examine the works upon which it rests. The cruises strain the Ships. Thus, upon their return from their station, they are successively classified among the ships in need of more or less considerable repair. Each year, the weather causes damages and wear to those that remain in the Ports. Already several of the guardships are reputedly no longer in condition to undertake a hard cruise, and within a year or two, a number of those which are presently considered to be in excellent condition will be counted among the damaged ships in want of repair.

All the ships being built or repaired are therefore destined to replace rather than increase the number quoted above, and we must look upon this column as the feeding branch of the Navy. The ports have a three year supply of timber at the rate of 22 thousand tons per year. They must be constantly maintained on the same footirig. Thus, My lord, these are sufficient means for the continuous pkeep of the foundation upon which we must direct our speculations.

We have placed the next column in the real foundation of the Navy, although the ships there included are not really in condition to put to sea. These are the sick who, in case of need, would soon be able to join the Army.

As for the Vessels that require major repair and consist of 14 Ships and seven frigates, they get weather-beaten a little more every day. We will see more of these go down among the condemned ships rather than come back into the column of ships in repair where they have to return before being reinstated among the sound ships. The last column contains only nominal forces and I will not mention them here. They are counted in the alphabetical list attached to the table. This list is composed of 141 Ships of the line, 88 frigates, 67 Vessels of lesser importance, for a total of 296 sails. I must warn you, My lord, that I placed in America by anticipation a few frigates and sloops which have not yet left for their destination. Furthermore, the list indicates the domestic distribution of the guardships and ships not in commission in the Ports and which, for this reason, I have omitted in the table.

The conclusion that we may draw from this table can be divided into two main points:

1. The number of Vessels of which the real forces of the English Navy are composed amounts to 92 Ships of the line, 67 frigates and 56 vessels of lesser importance, for a total of 215 sails.

2. Of this number those actually in activity consist of 35 Ships of the line, 61 frigates and 55 Vessels of lesser importance, for a total of 151 sails of which 89 are employed in North America.

By having the condition of each ship in different ports examined by expert people, I have avoided errors and I was able to classify each ship according to her worth. This examination brought us to find out that among the ships that are not employed, only 32 and one frigate could be readied at the first order, and 25 ships and six frigates would require repairs of 6 to 8 months.

If we distribute these forces by dividing them into squadrons of the required strength in time of war in the Mediterranean, Africa, the East and the West Indies, Europe, everywhere finally where England has possessions to defend, we find that they present an imposing display when gathered under a single point of view, but when they are spread over the immensity of the globe, they become hardly adequate to fulfill so many purposes, and England, by remaining on the defensive, would present many a weak point to her enemies. I am convinced that the English Ministers repeat this to themselves once in a while, and I believe that they are more occupied with preserving what they have than with planning new conquests. However, if we have every ground to remain at ease with respect to the considered designs of England, since we must suppose them to conform to the interest, the faculties, as well as the dispositions of a Nation and a Government which are inclined toward peace, we have everything to fear from sudden events which opportunity, chance, or the carelessness even of individuals may bring about, when we look at the advantage they would derive at the beginning of a war from their 150 vessels in activity. Three fourths of these ships being composed of frigates or sloops are most apt to privateer and consequently to make a clean sweep of our fishing and trade at a time when both of these would be defenseless.

Besides this advantage which the English, in their bad faith, will draw from the ships they have constantly cruising on all the seas, this system offers them a more honorable one in the number of officers that it forms for a profession requiring more practice than theory. Indeed, we cannot conceal from ourselves that the great superiority of the English Navy consists especially in the confidence and the emulation which reigns in it, spirit founded on the success and the experience of its officers who are accustomed to master their element. This is what would give them especially the means to wage an offensive war, the only type of war that befits a nation that can be lead only by victories and that would be without strength and credit in the course of a slow war barren of glorious ventures.

However, if these considerations, joined to our past experience, arouse our vigilance more and more and lead us to be more cautious than ever, we will be able to avoid in the next war as fatal a beginning as that of the preceding war. Once we are out of this awkward situation, everything leads us to assume that, regardless of the development of the war so to speak, it will end only with the complete downfall of England.

You will observe, My lord, that this conjecture rests mostly on the political situation of England and the contradiction that exists between her financial means and the extreme measures which she must take in order to activate her forces. This year Parliament voted for only 28 thousand sailors and the money voted for the Navy, although deemed to be insufficient, amounts to three million seven hundred and twenty seven thousand pounds Sterling. Should a rupture with the House of Bourbon occur, it would not be extravagant to estimate that England would have to employ three times as many sailors as she has today and triple the expense in proportion in order to support a war exposed to more considerable risks and losses than those suffered today against a Nation which has no Navy.

You will ask perhaps, why triple the number of sailors since it is obvious from the table on the Navy that one could not in any case double thenumber of Vessels in activity today? There are two answers to that: onestems from observation and the other from fact. The first one shows thatamong the 60 Vessels which remain to be employed, we count 57 Ships of the line which consequently require more numerous crews than the frigatesand sloops presently at Sea, and, furthermore, one would also have to double the crews of the Ships already employed since they have only a few Privateers to fight today and need only a sufficient number of men to maneuverthem. The second answer points to the example of the last war when we sawGreat Britain use as many as 80 thousand sailors.

I shall end these observations, My lord, on the maritime forces of England by informing you that I made the necessary inquiries concerning therumors found in the public papers to the effect that a few individuals herehad Privateers with letters of marque against the Americans, and I foundthat this rumor, which is contrary to the assurances given to me by Lord North in this respect, is totally unfounded.

[Enclosure ー Table No. 1]

Table of the English Navy including the Cruising Stations of Commissioned Ships and the Condition of Non-Commissioned Ships, under date of 21 June 1776