On the 21st of August 1776, Lord George Germain received another Dispatch from Genl Clinton, dated July 8th in which he says that it appeared by Letters, which he had recd from Genl. Howe that he was not expected or called upon for any immediate assistance on the opening of the Campaign. That he [had] not named either the time or place of joining him, but rather seemed, on the contrary, to intimate his wishes that some operations might take place to the Southward, & had pointed out Charlestown as an object of importance. That upon these grounds, & upon receiving Intelligence, that the Works erected by the Rebels on Sullivan's Island, were in an imperfect & unfinished state, he was induced to acquiesce in a proposal made by the Commodore to attempt the Reduction of that Fortress by a Coup de Main ー That he thought it possible, at the same time that it might be followed by consequences of immediate advantage to His Majesty's Service, not intending at that season of the year, to have proceeded further than Sullivan's Island ー That with this view they sailed from Cape Fear on the 31st May, and were joined on their passage by the RangerSloop of War, by which he recd Lord Geo. Germain's Dispatch of the 3d March which has been already stated; and thinking upon a consideration of that Dispatch, that the object in view came within the description of those pointed out therein, he resolved to proceed ー That the passage from Cape Fear was attended with great difficulty, & delays That upon a consideration of the whole & Lord Cornwallis agreeing with him in opinion, he resolved as the best means of co-operating with the Fleet, to take possession of Long Island, which was represented to communicate with Sullivan's Island, by a Ford passable at low-water, & with the Main by Creeks navigable for boats of draught. That this object was effected, and the whole Force assembled on Long Island on the 18th June, except a few Recruits, who were left on board the Transports for deception ー That his first business after landing was to examine the Ford, which, to his unspeakable mortification, he found to be 7 feet at low water, instead of 18 inches as had been reported, so that his Operations upon Long Island, were limited & confined ー for altho' his situation was an object of jealousy both to Sullivan's Island & to the Main, yet as he had not boats for more than 6 or 700 Men, he was reduced to one attack without being able to favour that by any diversion on the other ー That he acquainted the Commodore with this discovery, & with his apprehension that he should not be able with his Troops to take that share in the attack upon the Fort, he was once in hopes to have done; assuring him however than whenever he should think to begin his attack, he would make every possible diversion in his favor, or send him 2 Battalions to act on his side, in case he & the Genl Officers appointed to command them, should be of opinion they could be protected in their landing & employed to advantage ー That in answer to this, it seemed to be understood that he should give the best support he could, & they only waited for a Wind to begin the attack ー That at that time the Rebels had an Intrenchment & Battery on the point of Sullivan's Island, where he intended to have landed, from which he thought they might be dislodged by the light Ordnance he had on shore; but unfavourable Winds having prevented the Fleet from making the attack for 4 days, the Rebels removed from their station & took up some very strong ground 500 yds back, with a more extended Front That this Post having very great advantage in point of situation & being defended by 4 or 5000 Men, he thought it could not be attempted without a manifest sacrifice of his Troops and accordingly had it in contemplation to make an attempt on Hederal's Point upon the Main, by making a landing within 3 miles of it ー That he made a request to the Commodore, that some Frigates might be directed to co-operate with him in that attempt, to which he assented; but as his movements depended in great measure upon those of the Fleet, it was impossible to decide positively upon any plan ー That about 7 o'clock on the 28th June the Fleet was discovered going upon the attack of the Fort on Sullivan's Island; but as when they brought up they did not appear to be within such a distance as to avail themselves of their fire from their tops, grapeshot, or musketry, he was apprehensive no impression would be made upon the Battery, & he likewise saw, that the 3 Frigates supposed to have been destined to cut off the Rebel communication with Hederal's Point & favour his attack upon it, were aground, immediately after the 4 leading Ships had taken their stations. That during the Attack he made every diversion by cannonade while the sands were uncovered - That small armed Vessels were ordered to proceed towards the Point of Sullivan's Island, but that they all got aground ー That the Troops were disposed of in such a manner as to be a portée to attempt the landing, either on Sullivan's Island or the Main as circumstances, during the attack, should make necessary. That the Cannonade of the Fleet continued without any favourable appearances 'till night ー That upon an expectation that it would be renewed in the morning he made the best dispositions he could, of the small Ordnance he could collect, to enable him if necessary whilst the tide suited to have made one effort on Sullivan's Island, an Attempt however contrary to every Military Principle, & justifiable only in a case of the success of the Fleet or of its distress, to support the one or relieve the other ー That at day break finding, to his great concern, that the Fleet had retired & that there was no intention of renewing the Attack, he proposed to the Commodore to proceed as soon as possible, to the Northward and that they should sail in a few days for New York.

On the 22d of August the Lords of the Admiralty communicated to Lord Geo: Germain, a copy of a Dispatch from Sir Peter Parker to Mr: Stephens dated Bristol ー in 5 fathom hole within Charles Town Bar, the 9th July 1776, in which he says, that the Sphynx & Pensacola Packet, havingon the 26th May returned from reconnoitering Charles Town, the Engineers Report of the state of the Fortifications and the Works carrying on, added to an Account Genl Clinton had recd that the Troops would not be wanted so soon as he expected, having made an attempt on that place advisable, the Fleet on the 30th May, got over the Bar at Cape Fear, & on the 1st of June anchored off Bull's Bay ー That on the 2d of June the Ranger & Delegate went to sound the North end of Sullivan's Island & Long Island, as far as the Rattle Snake, & next day from the northward of the Rattlesnake to the northward of Long Island ー That on the 4th of June the whole Fleet except the Ranger, anchored off Charles Town Bar ー That on the 5th the Delegate, covered by the Friendship, sounded the Bar, & laid down buoys preparatory to the intended entrance of the harbour on the next day by the Frigates ー That on the 6th Capt Willis was directed to place the Ranger, St Lawrence and Friendship, where Genl Clinton thought proper ー That on the 7th the Bristol's assistance being judged necessary, & it being the opinion of the Captains, Masters & Pilots, that if she were brought to 17 Feet 6 Inches, she might be got over the Bar, orders were immediately given for her guns to be taken out, and the ship lightened for that purpose; & the same day all the Frigates, & most of the Transports got over into 5 fathom hole ー That on the 10th the Bristol got over the Bar with some difficulty That on the 15th the Captains were given the Arrangements for the Attack of the Batteries on Sullivan's Island, & the General was informed the next day by letter, that the Ships were ready ー That on the 21st signal was made to unmoor, to cause a diversion, tho' the Wind was contrary, it being imagined that the Troops were engaging the Rebels at the northend of Sullivan's Island ー That this Day the General fixed on Sunday the 23d for the joint attack ー That on the 23d June, a private signal was made to the General, that the Ships would go on the attack at one o'clock, but the Wind coming contrary the signal was hauled down at 11 o'Clock. That on the 25th the Experiment arrived & came over the Bar the next day, when a new arrangement was made for the attack. That on the 27th Wind being flattering the private signal was made to the General & the Ships got under weigh but were obliged to Anchor, the Wind flying suddenly round to the northward, That on the 28th of June at half past 9. Genl Clinton was in formed by signal, that the ships would go on the attack. At half an hour after 10 the signal was made for weighing, and about a quarter after Eleven they brought up against the Fort. That Coll James in the Thunder Bomb, covered by the Friendship threw several shells a little before and during the Engagement in a very good direction ー That the Sphynx, Actaeon & Syren, which were to have gone to the Westward, to prevent the Fireships, or other Vessels from annoying the ships engaged, & to cut off the Retreat of the Rebels when driven from their Works ran aground thro the ignorance of the Pilots, from whence the Sphynx & Syren got off in a few hours, but the Act[a]eon remained fast 'till the next morning when she was set on fire by her own crew to prevent her falling into the Enemies hands ー That during the time of their being abreast of the Fort, which was 10 hours, a brisk fire was kept up by the Ships, with intervals, & they had the satisfaction, after being engaged 2 hours, to oblige the Rebels to slacken their fire very much, & to drive large parties of them several times out of the Fort, which were replaced by others from the Main. That the Forts were totally silenced & evacuated near an hour & half but the Rebels finding that our Army could not take possession, about 6 o'clock a considerable Body of theirs re-entered the Fort, and renewed the firing from 2 or 3 guns, the rest being as supposed dismounted ー That about 9 o'clock, it being very dark, great part of their Ammunition expended, the people fatigued, the tide of Ebb almost done no prospect from the Eastward, and no possibility of their being of any further service, the ships were ordered to withdraw to their former moorings ー That their Lordships will see plainly by this Account that if the Troops could have co-operated on this Attack, His Majesty woud have been in possession of Sullivan's Island ー But he begs leave here to be clearly understood lest it should be imagined he means to throw even the most distant reflexion on the Army ー for that he should not discharge his conscience were he not to acknowledge, that such was his opinion of The King's Troops, from the General to the private Soldier that after he had been engaged some hours & perceived that The King's Troops had not got a footing on the North end of Sullivan's Island, he was perfectly satisfied, that the landing was impracticable, & that the attempt would have been the destruction of many brave men, without the least probability of success ー And that this he is certain will appear to be the case when Genl Clinton represents his situation ー He then, after giving an Acct of the State of The Ships, of the number of Men killed & wounded, & of the behaviour of the Officers & Men upon the occasion, concludes with acquainting, that all the Regiments will be reembarked in a few days ー That the first Brigade will sail in a day or two under convoy for New York & that the Bristol & Experiment, will, he hopes, soon follow with the remainder.