[Versailles, 15 March 1776]
Si vis pacem, para bellum. This ancient axiom will no doubt appear trivial, but none the less will it be eternally true. France, for the sake of equity in the first place, but likewise on account of her temporary powerlessness, should avoid war with the greatest care: but these two reasons should not plunge her into a fatal torpor, which would draw upon her the contempt of all Europe, and would certainly increase the boldness of her enemies; ー a great Power always has some. If my neighbour's house is on fire, both reason and prudence demand that I should take every possible precaution to save myself from it. Without taking such precautions, my house is bu rnt with my neigh- bour's, and nobody pities me.
America is on fire; it is a neighbour of the French Colonies. The war which has broken out there must naturally be long and stubborn, and weaken, and cost much to both belligerent parties: what means more natural and ea.sy can they find, to recover at once from their losses, than to seize the French Colonies? It is difficult to perceive any ineans better and more prompt: the facility of one conquest gives rise to a desire for others, and pretexts are easy to find.
Whatever may be the result of the war which is going on in America, the wounds of both peoples will be great, and the grumbling infinite; the King of Great Britain will then see himself forced, in order to appease it, to make some advantageous operation which shall appear to compensate his. people for their losses.
From all these considerations, and others well thought out, there appears to result the absolute necessity of putting in safety, as far as possible, the French Colonies, and of not losing a moment in so doing: when one is threatened with dangers, one cannot sleep quietly until they have been averted.
After having taken all necessary precautions to avert the dangers which threaten, would it not be wise policy, in order to remove them still farther off, to help the American Insurgents secretly and without compromising ourselves? Cannot France sell both to the English and the Americans those things which they respectively have need of, and modify her commerce according to such rules of policy as may be desirable?
Whatever course the King may take in the circumstances, it seems that England will always have preponderating forces in America. In the latter case, could we not, and ought we not to give her, in concert with Spain, some fears for her European possessions? It seems that this might be done without assuming a threatening air, and while preserving all outward appearance of most perfect harmony.
England is powerfully armed, and at great expense, can we flatter ourselves that she will not wish to take advantage of all that, and can we rely on the hope of her moderation?
Saint Germain.