The truth of the picture which has been drawn of our present situation with regard to England cannot but be acknowledged. It attracted long ago the attention of the King's Council and the reflections contained in the Memoire on which His Majesty o"rders an opinion were thereupon made. 3 What is contained, then, in that Memoire, the truth and justice of which are felt throughout, will not be repeated; but, passing directly to the conclusion, it is thought that, practically, it is necessary. 1st. To commence by maintaining the confidence of the English ministry. 2nd. That it is not unsuitable, and is even necessary, to assist the insurgents indirectly. by supplies of munitions or of money, but withJout making any treaty with them until their independence is established and notorious. It is necessary even that that assistance be always cloaked and hidden and may appear to come only in the way of commerce, so that we may at any time deny it. 3rd. That it is time to quit the state [of] apathy in which we appear to be plunged; but to quit it warily and with prudence. It is well therefore to begin by allowing the troops and vessels, which the English destine against their colonies, to leave, so as to let the campaign open, and to try and get notice of all occurrences in order to be able to act accordingly. 4th. That in the meantime the Navy ought to provision its arsenals with everything which could be required in order to arm next year as strongly as possible. 5th. That from this very year preparations be made to send into the colonies, towards the month of September, a squadron which might overawe the English or at least render difficult the enterprises which they may entertain against Martinique or St. Domingo, and which could only take place with troops already wearied and with vessels long at sea. 6th. Lastly, in accordance with the circumstances then existing, preparations be made in the course of the winter to deal them in India, a blow which would be very dangerous for them; by aiding the native powers which bear their yoke but impatiently. Such as the projects which may be formed at present while avoiding compromising ourselves; but it cannot be concealed that there will never be a more favourable time for reducing the power of England than when, still loaded with the debts of the previous war, she is obliged to contract new and very considerable debts for that which she is waging against her colonies and when, deprived of their commerce, the downfall of her credit and of her public funds appears inevitable.

It must also be considered that in the present situation of Europe there is no reason to fear that the English .may employ the resource,.which has always succeeded so well for them, of raising against us a territorial war. Our alliance with the Court of Vienna does not permit us to suspect that Court; it also guarai;itees us on the score of the King of Prussia. The only diversion which she could cause us, would therefore be a war of Russia upon Sweden, whom we could assist with a little money, and who, in her present state, could make a lengthy resistance, especially as the health of the King of Prussia gives reason tq believe that he could not meddle therein.

All these considerations together then would lead to the conclusion that the offensive is the sole means of reestablishing our Navy on the one hand and on the other of weakening that of England and the sole means of definitely securi.ng the peace of the Continent which has never been troubled except by their intrigues or their money and which wil,l be still less disturbed by reason of the respectable footing on which the King's troops will be placed in consequence of the projected arrangements.

But this project and even that of simple precautions must be governed by the state of the finances; and the funds which may be destined for the navy will be considerable, even if we were to maintain only simple precautions, and must be assured for several years; since even if we maintain only the simple defensive, there is every appearance that this defensive will entail a war.