A Paper sent to Lord North on 8th December 1777 relative to the American war and urging more efforts to be made at home.

The mode of carrying on the war in America has been such for the last two years that the fleet has not been employed in the purposes in which it can be most useful 

towards distressing the enemy, and making them feel their inability of holding out against the mother country.

Lord Howe has had this year under his command about 90 ships of all sorts, six of them of the line and ten two-deck ships, that is to say ships of fifty and forty-four guns; and it was natural to suppose that with such a force properly stationed he could have made it very difficult for the Americans to receive their supplies, carry on their trade, and fit out privateers to annoy the trade of Great Britain. The contrary how ever has been the case [has happened], because the greatest part of Lord Howe's fleet has been employed in convoying, embarking and disembarking the troops, and at tending the operations of the army, which his Lordship in his first letters after his arrival in America mentions as his principal object, to which all others must give place. I do not mean to say that this was wrong, but the consequence of it was that our trade suffered, and that the enemy got the supplies from Europe by which they have been enabled to resist us.

It must not however be imagined that any force will be sufficient entirely to execute the purpose of blocking up all the rebels' ports and putting a total stop to their privateering; for along so extensive a coast, full of harbours and inlets, many ships will in spite of all our efforts get in and out by taking advantage of their knowledge of the coast, of dark and long nights, and events of wind and weather favourable to their purposes. However, we may certainly distress them infinitely more than has hitherto been done, and throw such burdens upon their trade and privateering as to make it difficult to carry on either without considerable loss, which, it is to be hoped, together with their want of necessaries from Europe, would soon make them tired of the war.

But in order to be able to employ the naval force in America effectually to this purpose, it is absolutely necessary that the army should secure the possession of several places along the coast which are tenable (independent of a fleet to defend them) against any force the Americans can bring against them. These places must be such as the King's ships can resort to at all times and seasons, and which will give them shelter and refreshments for their men; and it is necessary that one of them at least (exclusive of Halifax) should afford complete and secure conveniences for careening and refit ting the ships, without which both the ships and men will soon become unfit for cruising, which it is to be feared is already the case of many of Lord Howe's squadron.

Such ports are absolutely necessary, and without them no such naval war as is now recommended can be maintained so as to answer the purposes expected; for it must be remembered that cruisers can keep the sea only for a limited time, and that they must have friendly ports to repair to, to wood and water, and to supply their want of stores, and repair their defects, as also for the preservation of the health of their people. This was the idea of the Admiralty from the beginning of the war, and Lord Howe was accordingly by his instructions directed to consider and propose to us what ports were in his opinion properest for these purposes; but he has as yet made no return thereupon.¹

To supply what has been omitted in this particular, I would propose that a com missioner of the navy with proper assistants should go over in the first ships, with power to make such naval establishment and in such place as upon consulting with Lord Howe shall be thought most advisable. New York, Rhode Island, or Philadelphia, would in all probability effectually answer these purposes; but it is impossible to decide the point at this distance, and therefore I would leave it to be settled on 

the spot and with Lord Howe's advice, who from the experience he has had and his local knowledge will be, it is to be presumed, a perfect master of the subject.

The Navy Board should be directed to send out what materials and artificers they may think proper for the beginning such establishment; but as it will take some time before this business can be completed, particular attention should be had, and immediate orders given, to provide for the security of Halifax, which since the late fatal event is in my opinion in imminent danger of an attack from New England early in the spring. If that important place should fall into the hands of the enemy, it would be a blow not easy to be recovered, as it is the only port in the whole continent of America where ships can be cleaned and refitted at this time, and is the seat of a commissioner of the navy with an established naval yard and proper artificers and materials for carrying on the business. It is to be always remembered that the fleet alone cannot defend the place, and that there must be a reinforcement of troops and additional works, if the present are not sufficient to repel every attempt of an enemy. While the American forces were employed at a distance, and the people of New England were expecting an attack at home, a small garrison was suffucient; but that is no longer the case, and as the rebels have no better means of employing their northern army than in attacking Canada or Halifax, and probably both, it seems to be our duty to attend to the security of these very important posts.

And for the better carrying on the naval service in that very extensive continent, it seems advisable that the command should be divided into two parts at least, viz the northern and southern; the first to include all Nova Scotia and Canada, the other from the Bay of Boston inclusive to Georgia. [But this cannot effectually take place till the naval establishment in the centre is formed; and therefore Lord Howe should be directed to send a sufficient naval force to Halifax early in the spring to cooperate with the land forces in case the place should be attacked.]

It is much to be wished that a separate command was also fixed in the southern colonies; and perhaps Port Royal in South Carolina would be a very proper place for the headquarters of that squadron. But I fear that at present this arrangement can not be executed, for unless we are masters of the shore by means of our army, or by the goodwill of the inhabitants, none of the purposes wanted for the fitting and refreshing our ships can be obtained; and I can see nothing more to be done with regard to that district as yet than to leave it as it now is, giving directions to Lord Howe to employ as many cruisers to the southward as he can possibly spare, and to relieve them from time to time from his central post.

[It would also be highly proper to have a separate command for the Floridas and the Bahama Islands, for the security of those colonies and the Jamaica trade passing the Gulf: this command should consist of frigates and such vessels as the harbours in those parts will admit and afford them a proper place to careen and refit.]

Lord Howe should be told that his principal object now should be to block up the American ports, (and also to cooperate with the army in any attempts that may be thought advisable and practicable for making ourselves masters of those ports, destroying their shipping, and alarming and attacking their coast upon every proper occasion].² For these purposes he should keep as many cruisers at sea in small squadrons as his force will enable him to do; and it should be pointed out to him to be particularly attentive to the sending frequent intelligence to England of any armed vessels fitting out in America, for want of which 18 rebel privateers of whose existence we had no intelligence from his Lordship sailed at once from Boston and Salem [and came upon us unprepared in different parts, having appeared first on the Banks of Newfoundland where they took the Fox and did considerable damage to the fishery, while others attacked the homeward-bound West India convoy, and some had the audaciousness to insult our own coast and the trade in the British Channel].

It seems to me to be within the scope of the present subject to say a word or two on the state of our naval force at home [as all our exterior efforts are derived from that centre], and to consider whether it is adequate to the services that may be expected from it. We have 42 ships of the line in commission at home, which may fairly be considered as ready for service. I fear that France and Spain united have at least an equal number in Europe in commission, and I believe they have many more ready to receive men. I observe that France has only sent one ship of the line out of Europe, therefore her whole naval force may be said to be at home. Spain has no less than 42 ships of the line in commission, many of which are in foreign parts; and they certainly already have or can collect a formidable fleet at the Havana without detaching from Europe.

[The French have lately sent a large number of troops to their West India islands, with artillery and artillery officers, dismounted dragoons, and every other apparatus of war.]

We are vulnerable by a fleet at Jamaica, the Leeward Islands, and in North America, even without the aid of land forces; and with their aid, in the East Indies, and (if the Governor of Gibraltar's late account is true that he cannot defend the place without double his present garrison) in the Mediterranean also.

As soon as France determines to make war a squadron will be sent to attack us in one of these parts. We shall not know where the storm will fall, therefore the only measure of safety will be to have a respectable force in every part, [or at least to have a sufficient force in readiness at home to make large and immediate detachments to all our distant possessions]. Will our 42 ships supply the necessary detachments to answer this purpose, and to leave us superior at home to anything the House of Bourbon can bring against us in Europe after their detachment is made? Certainly not. Therefore, unless we are sure that France has no hostile intentions, is it prudent for us to remain a moment longer in our present state?

It will take a twelvemonth to get 25 more ships of the line ready for sea; 7 of these 25 (including the Victory) are now ready to receive men, and if they were commissioned would be ready for sea early in the spring; and 7 others would be immediately taken in hand, and ready to be commissioned in about two months. If we are in imminent danger of a foreign war (which in my opinion is the case), a day ought not to be lost. What shall we have to answer for if we are taken unprepared, and reduced to the necessity of either leaving our distant possessions undefended or seeing France and Spain in the Channel with a superior fleet?

In short, if we are certain that France and Spain will not take advantage of our distresses, our force at home is more than sufficient, and the public ought not to be burdened with that enormous expense; but on the other side, if from their falsehood and repeated breaches of their most solemn promises relative to succours sent to America, [and from the great armaments they have made notwithstanding the distress of their finances, at least those of France,] we may conclude that they are at the bottom our inveterate enemies, and are only waiting for the favourable moment to strike the blow, I do think we risk the whole with regard to the safety of our country if we are any way remiss in using every precaution and exertion for our defence that our present circumstances require.³

I would therefore humbly advise that the 7 ships now ready to receive men, or at least 6 of them, should be commissioned, and that orders should be given for getting an equal number ready to receive men. Before it comes to their turn to be commissioned, events will show whether it is necessary to proceed farther.