[Extract]
[At sea in the English Channel, 31 July 1778]1
. . . From the French stealing away in the night, I conclude they are very much damaged and got into Brest the next day or the day after.2
As to the surmise that they were to go to Quiberon Bay, I think it is very probable if they had any intention to embark troops for a descent in England or Ireland; but I am inclined to think it very uncertain whether they will now attempt to carry such scheme into execution, after they have seen our strength and felt some hard blows. However, I have no doubt but they will refit their fleet with all possible expedition, and reinforce it to the utmost of their power; and if you have not very authentic accounts of the Toulon squadron’s being otherwise destined I shall believe they will join the Brest fleet, and that they will exert every nerve to dispute with us the superiority in the home seas.3 This I shall believe to be their plan until I know for certain that the Toulon squadron or some ships from Brest are sent abroad. Therefore, though it will certainly be right to have a squadron ready for the East Indies or elsewhere, yet I shall hope it will be thought not right to detach any ships before they do.
Even with this cautionary measure for keeping their grand fleet in awe, I fear if many frigates do not speedily arrive from America our coasts and trade will be exposed to frequent mischief from squadrons of frigates and privateers. Much more caution is necessary in conducting this than any former war; hence your Lordship will perceive that I consider the operations of the French in this war will be regulated by the schemes, informations, and advice of some able and well-informed British traitors and rebels.
