mémoire sur les operations auxquelles on pourroit employer nos forces navales contre l'ang^re.

Suivant lEtat de la marine remis par M. de Sartine le Roi a actuellement 50 v^x. de ligne; Savoir 17. a Toulon et 33. a Brest. de Ce departement 2. sont stationnés l'un a la martinique et lautre aux indes. Restent donc a Brest 31. v^x. et 17. a toulon en tout 48.¹ Sa M^té. aiant offert de faire passér de Ce dernier departement 10. v^x. a Cadix pour y etre aux ordres du roi dEsp^e et aiant promis de tenir a Brest 25. v^x. bien armés p^r occupér les Anglois jusqua Ce que les deux flottes du mexique et de Buenos aires soient rentrées en Esp^e,² il resulte que Ce qui restera dans lun et lautre departement de forces oisives Seroit insuffisant pris séparément pour rien entreprendre de remarcable. dailleurs il faut veillér a la defense interieure de la Mediterrannée; se menagér en cas de besoin des Remplacemens et se tenir en mesure detablir des croisieres pour favorisér notre commerce et interceptér Celui de nos ennemis.

La guerre survenant il paroit indispensable d'armér 3. ou 4. v^x. de ligne a Toulon pour apuyér les fregates qui auront ordre de croisér dans la mediterrannée et p^r. tenir net le Canal qui separe la Corse de la France. Si les anglois nenvoient pas une Escadre de quelque Consideration dans la mediterrannée, les v^x. de Toulon pourroient en automne avoir ordre de passér le detroit d'ou se rendant sur la cote daffrique ils pourroient si on le jugeoit utile tentér de recouvrér le senegal, ou au moin den ruinér le fort, ainsi que Celui de la riviere de Gambie ainsi que les autres Etablissemens que les Anglois peuvent avoir le long de cette Cote. peu de troupes suffiroient pour Cette opération; suiv^t les avis qu'on a pû se procurér les anglois sont tres foibles dans Cette partie.

des Six v^x. desarmés a Brest on pourroit en destinér un ou deux avec un pareil nombre de fregates pour Etablir dans Le Courant de L'Eté une croisiere au nord du Canal d'allemagne afin d'interceptér Les navires Anglois qui reviendroient d'Arcangel et de la Balthique avec des munitions navales. cest de ces parage que langleterre les tire touts maintenant depuis que lamerique septentrionale lui est fermée; il ne faut pas setendre en Raisonnemens pour rendre sensible LEmbarras ou se trouveroit Cette puissance si les approvisionnemens de Ce genre lui etoient rendus difficiles.

nos Vaisseaux aiant Lazile dans la mer du nord des ports de Gothembourg et de Marstrand qui appartiennent a la suede auroient une Retraite assurée dans le Cas ou lang^re enverroit une force superieure Contre Eux.

Linquietude de lEsp^e par raport au Retour de ses Gaillons du mexique et de sa flotte de Buenos aires aiant engagé le Roi a faire une disposition de ses forces navales qui occupe une portion Considérable de Celles d'angleterre, il semble dune bonne politique de ne negligér aucune demonstration qui en excitant et nourrissant L'inquietude de cette puissance loblige a un plus grand partage de ses efforts.

Les troupes qu'on fait passér en Bretagne y sont necessaires pour la sureté de Cette province et p^r la conservation si pretieuse de Brest, mais il ne faut pas se flatter qu'elles donnent une vive allarme a langleterre. La flotte destinée a Contenir nos escadres Eloigne toute idée de debarquement et dinvasion de Cette part. des demonstrations sur les cotes de normandie et de flandres seront dun tout autre effet. elles peuvent sexecutér avec ou sans le Concours dune force navale si Les anglois n'en ont pas toujours une pour y faire obstacle. c'est dans Cette Vue qu'on proposeroit d'assemblér un Camp en normandie et un autre entre Dunkerque et Boulogne. ils devroient Etre chacun de 30 bataillons et munis de tout Ce qui est necessaire pour acreditér le dessein d'une expedition. on pourroit a cet effet mettre un Embargo sur tous les batimens du canal quon jugeroit propres a un transport. Cette demonstration qui ne seroit nullement dispendieuse forceroit Les anglois a tenir une Escadre en Croisiere dans l'interieur de la manche Sans Les dispenser den avoir une beaucoup plus forte a louverture d'ouessant. on ne parle pas ici de lEmploi des fregates et d'autres batimens inferieurs que le Roi tient armés ainsi que de l'encouragement a donnér a la course. on a vû Ce que les americains malgré lEloignement ou ils sont de langleterre sont venûs faire sur les Cotes. LExample quils ont donné doit faire naitre Lemulation de le suivre.

apres avoir proposé ce qu'on estime praticable dans un moment ou toutes les vûes doivent se portér a rassurér LEsp^e Contre les allarmes quelle Conçoit p^r ses flottes, il semble necessaire d'avisér a un plan plus actif pour le moment ou le Roi degagé des Entraves qui le circonscrivent pourra donnér plus dEtendûe a ses vûes. Sa M^te. ne semble avoir que deux interets essentials dans La guerre qui menace de sallumér, Celui de Conservér ses possession en anlerique et Celles de lEsp^e et Celui de pretér une main assés secourable aux americains pour les aidér a secoüér la dependance de langleterre et a assurér Leur independance Civile sur les fondemens inalterables. il est donc important de Combinér les mesures a prendre de maniere a servir Ces deux interets. on estime en consequence que rien ne conduiroit plus directement a Ce but que lenvoi dune escadre francoise sur les cotes de lamerique septentrionale. Si La Guerre, Co^e il est a desirér Continue dans Cette Contrée elle ne trouvera point les forces navales des anglois en masse; une partie sera employée a apuyér les operations de terre pend^t que lautre dispersée sur limmensité de Cette Cote veillera a interceptér La Course et Le Commerce des americains. Cest Le Cas ou un chef intelligent pourroit frapér un coup bien avantageux en Se portant directement vers Le théatre des operations pour y attaquér les forces de mer angloises, et tachér de detruire avec Leurs v^x. de Guerre Ceux de transport qui seroient sous leur abry. Ce Coup frapé avec succés, La sureté de nos isles seroit pleinement Etablie puis que les anglois seroient sans moiens pour allér les inquietér. On ne fait pas mention ici de la Reconnoissance q'un service de Cette Consideration imprimeroit chez Les americains. Cette premiere operation consommée Lescadre, n'aiant plus de force majeure a Craindre pourroit se divisér. La moitié cinglér vers Le Sud en netoïant la mer de tous Les Croiseurs quelle pourroit y rencontrér, et termineroit par allér hivernér a Saint Domingue. Lautre division remonteroit vers Le nord et pourroit se porter sur terre neuve et y detruire la peche et Les Etablissemens de peche des anglois. on pourroit si La chose Etoit jugée plus utile laissér au Command^t La Liberté de se portér a Boston et de pretér secours aux nouveaux angleterriens pour secondér LEntreprise quils pourroient vouloir formér sur halifax et La nouvelle Ecosse.

on ne peut que presentér Lapercû des mesures auxquelles on peut se fixér, Cest aux gens de lart a les detaillér et a en preparér Les moiens. Si LEnvoi dune escadre au nord de lamerique nEtoit pas agrée, il seroit alors necessaire den destinér une pour Les antilles. Sa station La plus naturelle seroit a la martinique par Ceque de la elle veilleroit sur tous les Etablissemens du Roi sous le Vent. on pourroit encore sen servir pour Reprendre la dominique et la grenade, mais Ces avantages seroient bien foibles p^r Compenser ceux quon pourroit se promettre dune diversion dans le nord, dont Leffet sil Etoit Courronné du Succès abregeroit infailliblement la guerre.

on doit encore Considerér que Cette diversion seroit tres utile a lEspagne en ce qu'attirant dans le nord et y concetrant une grande partie des forces angloises, elle auroit plus de facilité p^r faire reussir Les Entreprises quelle jugeroit devoir formér.

de pareils projets ne pouvant reussir qu'autant quon est en mesure de prevenir LEnnemi, Ce nest quen menageant scrupuleusem^t le secret, et quen ne negligeant aucun moien p^r Lui donnér Le Change quon peut avoir un espoir fondé de succès.

quoiquil ne puisse Etre question dune grande expedition aux indes orientales peut être ne seroit il pas inutile den faire germér Lopinion et meme de l'accreditér par quelques demonstrations. Cepend^t co^e il nest pas possible d'abandonner nos Etablissemens dans Cette Contrée p^rpalem^t les iles de France et de Bourbon³ dont la conservation est tres interressante si la france ne Veut etre a jamais Exclue de linde, on pourroit formér une flotille de 3. fregates qu'on construit en hollande auxquelles on joindroit La Consolante. Ces quatre fregates qui ont beaucoup de creux, pourroient portér facilement et Sans genér LEquipage un renfort de mille a douze Cent hommes quon juge devoir etre suffisant p^r mettre Ces deux isles a labri de toute insulte. La force de lartillerie de Ces fregates et La Legereté de leur marche ne peuvent Leurs faire Craindre la rencontre d'aucune force Superieure.

[Translation]

[Versailles] January 1778

Report on operations in which our naval forces could be employed against England

According to the state of the navy submitted by M. de Sartine, the King currently has 50 ships of the line, as follows: 1'7 at Toulon and 33 at Brest. Of the latter group, one is stationed in Martinique and the other in the Indies, which leaves 48 total ships remaining: 31 at Brest and 17 at Toulon.¹ His Majesty having offered to release 10 of these 48 ships to Cadiz where they would be under the orders of the king of Spain,² and having promised to keep 25 well-armed ships at Brest to occupy the English until the two fleets from Mexico and Buenos Aires return to Spain, it results that the forces remaining on hand in each of the two departments would be insufficient taken separately to undertake any significant action. Moreover, it is essential that the internal defense of the Mediterranean be looked to as far as supplying needed replacements and in being prepared to deploy cruisers that would favor our commerce and intercept that of our enemies.

The war arriving suddenly, it seems paramount to fit out 3 or 4 ships from Toulon in order to provide back-up support for the frigates that will be patrolling in the Mediterranean and to keep the channel between Corsica and France clear. Provided the English do not send a squadron of considerable force into the Mediterranean, the Toulon ships could be ordered in autumn to pass the strait, an act that would place them on the African coast. From there, they could, ifjudged useful, attempt to recapture Senegal or at least to destroy the forts there and on the Gambia River, in addition to any other settlements the English may have along that coast. According to the information that we have been able to procure, the English are very weak in that region; thus a few troops alone would suffice for this operation. One or two of the six unarmed ships at Brest, with an equal number of frigates, could be designated for the establishment (over the course of the summer) of a cruising station to the north of the North Sea, which would allow for the interception of English merchantmen returning with naval munitions from Archangel and the Baltic. The English currently draw all of their naval stores from these waters since North America is closed to them. No further elaboration should be needed to convey the embarrassment in which this power would find itself if supplies of this sort were made difficult to procure.

With refuge available in the Swedish ports of Göteborg and Marstrand in the North Sea, our ships would have an assured retreat should England send out a superior force against them. Spain's concern over the return of its galleons from Mexico and its fleet from Buenos Aires having engaged the King to put at its disposal his own naval forces currently occupying a considerable portion of England's forces, it seems a good policy not to overlook any demonstration that, while exciting and feeding England's anxiety, may require a larger share of its efforts.

The troops sent to Brittany are needed there for that province's security and for the preservation, so essential, of Brest, but one need not be deluded into thinking that their presence alarms the English. The fleet intended to sustain our squadrons dismisses any possibility of disembarkation and invasion from this quarter. Demonstrations on the Normandy and Flanders coasts will have an entirely different effect. They can be executed with or without the participation of a naval force provided the English still do not have their own force there creating an obstacle. In view of these facts, we propose that one camp be assembled in Normandy and another between Dunkerque and Boulogne. Each camp ought to be of 30 battalions and furnished with everything necessary to substantiate the expedition's mission. To this end, an embargo could be placed on every Channel ship judged appropriate to use as a transport. This demonstration, which would be not at all expensive, would force the English to keep a squadron cruising in the English Channel without relieving them of the need for a much stronger one at the mouth of Ushant. We do not speak here of using frigates and other lesser ships that the King keeps armed, nor of the encouragement to be given privateering. We have seen what the Americans, despite their distance from the English, have been able to do on their coasts. We should all follow their example.

After proposing what we deem feasible during a time when all views should aim to reassure the Spanish regarding their concern over their fleets, it seems necessary also to recommend a more active plan for the future, when the King, freed from the fetters that bind him, will be able to give greater reign to his views. His Majesty appears to have but two essential interests in the war that threatens to ignite: preserving his and Spain's possessions in America and sufficiently aiding the Americans in breaking free from their dependence on England such that their civil independence established on a firm foundation will be assured. It is therefore important to act in such a manner as to serve these two interests. Seemingly, nothing would lead more directly to this goal than the installation of a French squadron on the coasts of North America. If the war continues in that region, as is to be desired, finding the English naval forces en masse would be unlikely as some of their forces would be supporting ground operations while the rest, scattered along the immensity of that coast, would be working to intercept the commerce and cruising ships of the Americans. This being the case, an intelligent leader could strike a very advantageous blow by going directly to the theater of operations to attack the English sea forces there, and to try to destroy the English warships and the transport vessels under their protection. Once accomplished, the security of our islands would be fully assured since the English would then be without the means to disturb them. Perhaps it is worth mentioning here the extent to which a service of this magnitude would impress the Americans. This first operation completed, the squadron, no longer having a major force to fear, could be divided with half its contingent moving southward to winter at Saint-Domingue while clearing the sea of all cruisers encountered in its path; the other division heading back northward to Newfoundland and destroying the fishery and English fishing settlements there. Or, ifjudged more useful, the commander could be allowed the discretion to head for Boston to assist the New Englanders in any undertakings they might want to form against Halifax and Nova Scotia.

Presented here is just a conceptual notion of the operations to which we could commit ourselves; we leave it to the experts to flesh out the details and arrive at the means to execute them. If sending a squadron to North America is not agreed upon, it would then be necessary to send one to the Antilles. The most logical station for this squadron would be at Martinique because from there it could watch over all the King's windward settlements. It could also be used to recapture Dominica and Grenada but any advantages gained there would not be so great as those sustained from a diversion in the north, a move which, if successful, would undoubtedly shorten the war.

It is also worth taking into account that this diversion would be very helpful to Spain in that it would keep the English forces occupied in the north thereby making it easier for Spain to succeed in its undertakings.

Given that such projects can only be successful inasmuch as one is in a position to forestall the enemy, it is only in carefully protecting the secrecy of our strategy and in assuring all means of throwing the enemy off the scent that one can hope for success. While there is no possibility of sending a large expedition to the East Indies, it might be useful at least to consider the idea and even lend it credibility by engaging in some demonstrations. However, as it is not possible to abandon our settlements in that region, particularly Ile de France and Ile de Bourbon³ whose preservation is vital if France does not want to be forever excluded from India, a squadron comprised of three frigates (currently being built in Holland) and the Consolante could be formed. These four frigates with their great depths of hold could easily carry, without inconveniencing the crew, a reinforcement of between a thousand and twelve hundred men which should be sufficient to protect the two islands against any insult. The artillery force and sailing speed of these frigates render them virtually fearless of an encounter with a superior force.